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Source Country	Intelligence Inform	ation Special Report
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COUNTRY USSR		
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	The Possible	Nature of Moder	n Ware and the	
		Branches of the		
		by		
	marshal of t	he Soviet Union	M. Zakharov	
Th	e theory and pr	actice of milit	ary affairs testify	
that the	e principal con tly changing in	cepts of milita	ry strategy are possible nature of a	
future	war, the prepar	ation of the co	untry for it, the	
organiz	ation of the ar	med forces, and	the determination of	
tne met	nods of conduct the military-n	ing war. This	is caused, first of ion, the economic and	
morale	potentials of c	ountries, and t	he equipping of armies	;
with ma	ssive quantitie	s of new means	of armed combat. The	
the met	e influence on hods of achievi	the nature of s ng them is poli	trategy, its goals, an	ıd√
•		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		
As of the	the means of a	rmed combat are	developed, the scope, and its role and	
place i	n military art	change. If in	the past total victory	, j
was the	result of a mu	ltitude of indi	vidual successes	ţ
			and operational d has at its disposal	
such po	werful means of	armed combat a	s strategic nuclear	
			to be achieved in war.	
St	rategy based on	directives fro	m the political	
leaders	hip of the coun	try develops so	und methods of using	
militar	y-economic pote	ntial in war.	It determines the	
			ous branches of the a single strategic	
goal; a	nd these bases	are taken into	account when developin	ıa
the for	ms and methods	of using each b	ranch of the armed	_
forces.				
Th	is article cont	ains certain co	nsiderations on such	
aspects	of wars in the	, questions as present era: t	the possible types and heir nature and role.	ļ
and the	problems to be	resolved by in	dividual branches of	

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	the armed forces; and the probable directions of their development.
V	progressive one, the class structure of society is reorganized, and relations between classes, nations, and states change. This causes a basic change in policy and it acquires a different qualitative substance. In turn, changes in policy have a very decisive effect on the concept of each individual war, are responsible for differences between wars of one era and another, and are the objective basis for their scientific classification and for determining their type and nature. Under the influence of policy, and based on the development of production forces and on scientific and technical progress, the means, methods, and forms of combat operations are being improved, the scopes of wars keep expanding and they are becoming more and more destructive. Thus, each war in our present era is examined from two aspects—social—political and military—technical. History tells us that the inherent characteristics and
	diversity of wars, by virtue of their social-political nature, are conditioned, first of all, by the specific content and peculiarities of antagonistic contradictions fraught with the possibility of unleashing wars. The main and decisive contradiction in our era is the one between socialism and imperialism. The continuing process of the deepening crisis of capitalism is the cause of its increasing aggressiveness. It has become even more greedy, capable of any kind of venture.
	The policy of American imperialism is clearly aggressive in nature. Its principal goal is the destruction of the USSR, the elimination of the socialist system, and the achievement of world supremacy. The imperialists are



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economy is constantly increasing, the arms race is being stepped up, and a broad program is being implemented in preparation for a new world war.

After encountering the ever-growing might and the solidarity of countries of the socialist alliance around which all the progressive forces of the world are united, the American imperialists, along with all-round preparation for nuclear world war, started looking for other, as they think, less dangerous methods of achieving their aggressive aims. By using bribery, blackmail, and reactionary military coups, and by unleashing local wars, they are trying to weaken the socialist alliance and to break off piecemeal individual countries from the democratic camp. And this means that there still is a danger that the Soviet Union may be drawn into local wars.

As a result of the sharp shrinking sphere of capitalist supremacy and the increasing action of the law of uneven development of capitalism, the struggle among imperialist countries themselves for export markets, sources of raw material, and cheap labor is becoming more and more intensified. Sharp competition with the United States has been initiated by the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, and France, who until recently found themselves almost totally dependent on their transoceanic "ally". And although the imperialist countries are bound to each other by means of some definite obligations within the system of various military-political blocs directed against the countries of socialism, a further aggravation of contradictions between them may conceivably lead to armed conflicts.

Thus, in the light of the aforementioned contradictions, the basic types of wars in the present era may be wars between the two social systems of socialism and capitalism, revolutionary civil wars, wars of national liberation, and wars between two imperialist countries.

As regards the military-technical aspect, history indicates that the more diversified and powerful the arsenal of weapons at the disposal of the two sides, the more

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complex the nature of the war and the methods and forms of its preparation, initiation, and conduct. Under modern conditions of a complex military-political situation subject to rapid and sharp changes, and with the availability to armies of a wide variety of the means of armed combat, in all likelihood these means will be used in many combinations and in different sequences. In addition, we must take into account not only our own forces and means, but also the capabilities of the enemy and his views regarding the methods of unleashing and conducting armed combat.

International imperialism, especially the US imperialists, assuming that their superiority over the Soviet Union in nuclear weapons and the strategic means of delivering them is assured, expect to realize their aggressive plans with the aid of these weapons. Various theories have appeared which propound that nuclear weapons are the universal and the only means by which all tasks of war can be solved and victory achieved. These views are reflected in official US doctrine adopted in 1953 and called the strategy of "massive retaliation". It provided for the use of nuclear power in unleashing conflicts of any size. In light of this strategy the main attention in military build-up was given to the development of nuclear means and working out methods of their application.

However, the reliance by American imperialists on nuclear weapons alone has collapsed. The Soviet Union's successes in missile development and the creation and stockpiling of new, powerful types of nuclear munitions have forced the American strategists of nuclear blackmail to stop and think about the prospects of such a war. When evaluating the nuclear power of the USSR, McNamara, the former Secretary of Defense, in an interview with Life magazine (in 1967), had stated that "The Soviet Union will be capable of destroying all of America after receiving the initial powerful strike from the US".

When the policy of nuclear blackmail proved to be a failure, the imperialist circles began to look feverishly for an escape from the situation in which they found

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themselves. To conventional m	hey began to place considerable emphasis on eans of destruction in their aggressive plans.
In 1961, was introduced strategy. By "flexible and nuclear weapon adopted by NAT	the so-called strategy of "flexible response" in place of the "massive retaliation" January 1968, this strategic concept of phased responses using conventional and s depending on the degree of threat" was 0 as the official military doctrine. The US nds consider it to be the most adaptable to
the possibility durations can This also raise most powerful this strategy, deployment in western borders. Czechoslovak Seif conditions delivered and territory of the durations of the conditions of the condition	ally new in this concept is the admission of y that military operations of various be waged in Europe without using nuclear arms. es the significance of the Bundeswehr as the NATO land force in Europe. A derivative of the concept of "forward defense", permits the peacetime of a grouping of forces near the sof the German Democratic Republic and the ocialist Republic so that, in case of war, and are favorable, a preemptive strike can be the combat operations transferred to the he socialist countries, or at least to prevent deral Republic of Germany territory. 50X1-HUM
on preparation in regard to the NATO weapons. NATO council is continuously dealliance. Particle questions of grouping in Europe borders of the slovakia; fasteraising their reviewing certains.	in this strategy, too, the basic reliance is for nuclear war. The policy of intimidation he socialist countries is still one of the It was clearly evident at the session of the Brussels (November 1968) where threats were irected at the USSR and the entire socialist ticularly pointed remarks were made concerning of increasing the number of troops of the NATO rope; moving its main forces closer to the German Democratic Republic and Czechoer equipping of troops with modern arms, and combat and mobilization readiness; and ain conditions of the strategy of "flexible rds more "decisive actions".
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military and politica	he above-mentioned prerequisites of a l nature permits the conclusion to be resent arrangement of forces in the
international arena a	nd the status of the means of armed
nuclear and non-nucle	wars are considered possible: ar. If, by their social-political
nature, these wars, t	hrust upon the Soviet Union and other alist commonwealth by the imperialists,
are alike, and repres	ent a collision between two opposite they will be different in their
strategic aspect and	military-technical content. Nuclear
and non-nuclear wars other by the nature o	will fundamentally differ from each f strategic tasks to be solved; the
methods of accomplish	ing them and the types of strategic used; the duration and spatial scope;
the probable conseque	nces; and other factors. Each of those
division into periods	ific traits, its own particular 50X1-HUM, and its own strategic intensity.
Nuclear war is tunlimited use of all and, first and foremo	he kind of war in which both sides make the forces and means at their disposal, st, strategic nuclear forces as the
main means of destruc	tion. Taking part in this war are branches of the armed forces, which
were established in t	he theaters of military operations
of nuclear war is the	of the war. The most important feature decisiveness of its military-political
mising nature of its	nally tense, destructive and uncompromilitary actions.
•	start by a surprise enemy nuclear
attack; or by his unl	eashing a conflict using only
unfavorable, the use	but in which, should the outcome be of tactical, at first, and later also
the latter case the wa	ns is not excluded. In other words, in ar will not begin at once with an
unlimited use of nucle	ear arms but proceed in its development onsecutive and closely interrelated
periods, i.e., it wil	be conducted by phases.
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Undoubtedly, the most dangerous is the unleashing of war by an aggressor's sudden nuclear attack. This is what properly determines the strict requirements for maintaining the high combat readiness of our Armed Forces and their capability for delivering at any moment a crushing blow upon the enemy, and for ensuring the timely ascertainment of enemy preparation for attack. As far as a nuclear war beginning with the use of conventional means of destruction is concerned, its nuclear strikes may be preceded by a period of not only non-nuclear but also (limited nuclear actions. The means of armed struggle will be introduced in succession and, as a result, the scale of military 50X1-HL operations will increase gradually or spasmodically, simultaneously with the growth of their intensity. At the same time, a war that has begun by the use of conventional means of destruction or tactical nuclear weapons in a theater of military operations may cease before the use of strategic nuclear means will be required, i.e., it doesn't escalate into an unlimited war. Consequently, it must be assumed that nuclear war will not be reduced to some sort of single diagram. The most unexpected situations are possible.	Undoubtedly, the most dangerous is the unleashing of war by an aggressor's sudden nuclear attack. This is what properly determines the strict requirements for maintaining the high combat readiness of our Armed Forces and their capability for delivering at any moment a crushing blow upon the enemy, and for ensuring the timely ascertainment of enemy preparation for attack. As far as a nuclear war beginning with the use of conventional means of destruction is concerned, its nuclear strikes may be preceded by a period of not only non-nuclear but also limited nuclear actions. The means of armed struggle will be introduced in succession and, as a result, the scale of military 50X1-HL operations will increase gradually or spasmodically, simultaneously with the growth of their intensity. At the same time, a war that has begun by the use of conventional means of destruction or tactical nuclear weapons in a theater of military operations may cease before the use of strategic nuclear means will be required, i.e., it doesn't escalate into an unlimited war. Consequently, it must be assumed that nuclear war will not be reduced to some sort of single diagram. The most unexpected situations are				50X1-HUN
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period of war. However, we do not nourish any illusions regarding the duration of the waging of limited nuclear		From an nuclear war, concerning it into account, consequences operations wi in a nuclear decisive nucleoncluding pea nuclear war not only a no period of war regarding the	it is not difficults most probable of first of all, the of the use of structure of the use of structure is a posteriod. Besides, we have already en-nuclear period. However, we do duration of the	most typical lt to draw some ivision into post typical ivision into post experiments and into the post experiment of the phased been mentioned but also a limit of the post experiment of the phased but also a limit waging of limit	e conclusions eriods, taking scales and forces whose our opinion that ither one period and a development of , we allow for- ited nuclear ny illusions ted nuclear
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period of war. However, we do not nourish any illusions regarding the duration of the waging of limited nuclear wars. They, obviously, will quickly escalate into unlimited	wars, since the losing side will begin ceaselessly building up its strike in order to restore the situation.	From an nuclear war, concerning it into account, consequences operations wi in a nuclear decisive nucleoncluding pea nuclear war not only a nuclear war regarding the wars. They, wars, since the survey of the surv	it is not difficults most probable of first of all, the of the use of structure of the use of structure of the use of structure of the decisive war there is a posteriod. Besides, we have already en-nuclear period. However, we do duration of the obviously, will of the losing side with the structure of the decision of	most typical lt to draw some ivision into post typical ivision into post typical ategic nuclear e act. It is essibility of exportant the phased been mentioned but also a limit of not nourish a waging of limit uickly escalated lt begin cease	e conclusions eriods, taking scales and forces whose our opinion that ither one period and a development of, we allow for ited nuclear my illusions ted nuclear e into unlimited lessly building ion.

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	Nuclear war, by its scales, can impart a global scope right away, and envelop, directly or indirectly, many continents. The consequences of nuclear strikes are felt by all nations. In this kind of war, the two sides will bear tremendous losses in human resources and industrial 50X1 production, and will be denied the possibility of a planned restoration of their armed forces.	-HUM
ı	Thus, a war can be conducted by fundamentally new methods, differing considerably from the past ones. The main efforts of strategic nuclear forcesstrategic rocket	,
	troops, nuclear submarines and long-range aviation-will be directed at the destruction of the enemy strategic nuclear means and his military economic targets, disorganization of his system of state and military control, and destruction of main groupings of troops, first of all, his strategic nuclear means in theaters of military operations.	M
	The necessity of such a combining of efforts is dictated by a number of factors. First of all, there will take part in the accomplishment of the above-mentioned tasks a vast quantity of all-arms forces, dispersed over a large area and requiring a strongly centralized leadership for coordination of their actions. Secondly, the need will arise for carrying out a large number of measures connected with support of the actions of these forces, and especially of submarines and long-range aviation. Thirdly, various variants of introducing strategic nuclear forces can arise with the start of war. And finally, it must be kept in mind that with the improvement of the effectiveness of the antimissile defense and the air defense of the enemy and of the survivability of his means of attack and his most important military economic objectives, evidently, it will not always be possible to accomplish all the tasks with a single strike. In a number of cases, it will be necessary to carry out repeated launchings, assign new tasks, and reallocate targets of destruction. All of this says that the use of strategic nuclear forces must be planned in detail in advance and must be carried out under a single leadership. Combat operations of the armed forces will take armed forces.	-
	the armed forces will take such strategic forms as strikes	

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theaters o	ic nuclear forces, str f military operations f military operations enemy air attacks.	operations in ocean
will involute areas of the world war the remote to significate and possible the basic method destruction the air, wo fenemy areas of the areas of th	ve only certain count heir territories. (We is unlikely.) In the areas of the warring cant strikes, and, could personnel and mater o replenish the losses od of conduct of the vertage of his testempts to invade the rear war will be waged until the services.	will be a local war and ries and the corresponding assume that a non-nuclear course of a non-nuclear war, sides will not be subjected asequently, will retain rial resources, making it of the armed forces. The war will be the successive coupings on land, sea and in critory and also frustration territory of our country.
present er visualized individual strategic	a and their military a by us. Let us now en branches of the armed	le nature of wars of the and political goals are camine briefly the role of forces in achieving common wars, the tasks accomplished of their operations.
will be the that will the most interest of the	e strategic rocket tro constitute the basis of mportant targets in en f war. The tremendous acy and reliable delive e complete invulnerable in the air, and their h of the armed forces ity of a nuclear stril o the strategic rocket ange aviation will als After the exchange of	means of enemy destruction opps. It is their salvos of nuclear strikes against nemy territories and in the spower of the warhead, the very of warheads to the lity of missiles on the high combat readiness make the main means ensuring the se against the aggressor. In troops, nuclear submarines so be employed in the the initial nuclear strikes, tasks of delivering group and

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individual strikes against partially destroyed or newly detected strategic targets for their final destruction.
At the same time as the strikes of the strategic nuclear forces, intensive combat operations will be developed by the armed forces within the framework of strategic operations in the theaters of military operations, for the purpose of completely destroying the groupings of troops of the enemy. 50X1-HUM
A strategic operation in a theater of military operations will include operations of all branches of the armed forces united in a common aim and directed towards a single strategic goal. Strategic nuclear strikes against the most important economic and administrative-political centers and groupings of troops in a theater of military operations, and, first of all, against enemy nuclear means, and tactical strikes coordinated with them, will constitute the basis of a strategic operation in a theater of military operations, and their results will predetermine the nature of the operations of all the other troops.
Formations of the ground forces operating jointly with frontal aviation, and on coastal axes also with the participation of naval forces, are assigned the task of most rapid exploitation of the results of nuclear strikes for destruction of the surviving groupings of troops and nuclear means of the enemy, and seizing and holding the most important areas of his territory. Their basic form of combat operations will be front offensive operations, in which nuclear strikes will be delivered against the enemy by the rocket troops and front aviation, airborne and heliborne assault landings will be widely used, and swift strikes by tank groupings will be carried out.
A special feature of using the nuclear means of the fronts lies in the fact that they have to accomplish tasks of destroying primarily mobile targets, which represent the overwhelming majority of targets within the operational depth. This makes high demands for reconnaissance of all types, especially air reconnaissance, and for maintaining nuclear means in a degree of combat readiness which would
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	make it possible to carry out a strike in the shortest possible time.
•	The ground forces with a decisive offensive complete the destruction of the enemy and seize his territory. However, some of their groupings may suffer considerable 50X1-H losses and the need will immediately arise for restoring their combat effectiveness and, first of all, of the organs of control and of the troops of the first operational
	echelon. For this purpose there can be used reserve fronts.
	armies of the second echelon, and also forces and means from other axes. It is appropriate to note at this point that some authors in their theoretical works and articles often express the idea that apparently large units and formations of the ground forces equipped with missile/nuclear weapons do not require serious artillery or aviation support any more. One cannot agree with this. They will need both types of support since nowadays it is important not only to neutralize the centers of fire resistance impeding the advance of the troops but also to destroy at the same time such targets within the depth as operational-tactical nuclear weapons, which at any moment can be committed to action, as well as radio-electronic means, mobile reserves, and others. Main efforts of frontal aviation in a strategic
	operation will be directed towards destruction of enemy means of nuclear attack and repelling his air strikes. At the same time, destruction by strategic means of the most important targets in the rear of the enemy will allow concentrating the efforts of the aviation on destroying mobile and small targets.
J	In addition, aviation will have to fulfil tasks of reconnaissance of the enemy, since it is, for the present, the primary means of obtaining information for all of the branches of the armed forces, and, first of all, for the rocket troops.
	The main task of the airborne troops in a strategic operation is the most rapid exploitation of the results of nuclear strikes and cooperation with the ground forces in
	operation is the most rapid exploitation of the results of

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seizing important areas of enemy terr	itory, destroying his
means of nuclear attack, and disorgan	izing his control. The
basic form of their combat operations assault operation, conducted in close	Will be the airborne
branches of the armed forces. Unlike	the operations of
previous wars, in which airborne assa primarily in close proximity to the o	ult landings were made
their main goal was to seize areas of	terrain and hold them
until the approach of the troops adva	incing from the front.
the combat operations of airborne ass present-day conditions will be aggres	sault forces under
mobile in nature.	sive, offensive, and
Defeation and air air a	
Effective exploitation of the re strikes will require landings (drops)	sults of nuclear of airborne troops at
great depth, which, in turn, will inc	rease the duration of
their independent operations in the r	ear of the enemy. In
conjunction with this, the problem of Military-Transport Aviation aircraft	with the airborne
assault force to the landing area and	the support of its
combat operations, arming the airborn powerful fire and strike means, and i	e troops with more
mobility, assumes a particular urgence	Thereasing their
Long-range aviation having in it	a numamont of a conflict
Long-range aviation having in it with a large radius of action can acc	s armament aircraft complish the tasks
	ned, jointly with other
assigned to it, as was already mentio	
assigned to it, as was already mentio strategic nuclear forces, and also de	liver strikes against
assigned to it, as was already mentio strategic nuclear forces, and also de enemy targets in the depth of his ter	liver strikes against ritory, on the sea and
assigned to it, as was already mentio strategic nuclear forces, and also de enemy targets in the depth of his ter in the ocean by means of conducting in operations and in cooperation with other conductions.	liver strikes against ritory, on the sea and ts own independent her branches of armed
assigned to it, as was already mentio strategic nuclear forces, and also de enemy targets in the depth of his ter in the ocean by means of conducting i operations and in cooperation with ot forces. Of particular importance amounts	liver strikes against ritory, on the sea and ts own independent her branches of armed ng the tasks being
assigned to it, as was already mentio strategic nuclear forces, and also de enemy targets in the depth of his ter in the ocean by means of conducting i operations and in cooperation with otforces. Of particular importance amongular interest of the second	liver strikes against ritory, on the sea and ts own independent her branches of armed ng the tasks being aters of military
assigned to it, as was already mention strategic nuclear forces, and also desenemy targets in the depth of his term in the ocean by means of conducting is operations and in cooperation with other forces. Of particular importance among fulfilled by aviation in the main the operations is the destruction of enemy without which one cannot count on such	liver strikes against ritory, on the sea and ts own independent her branches of armed ng the tasks being aters of military y aircraft groupings, cessful operations of
assigned to it, as was already mentio strategic nuclear forces, and also de enemy targets in the depth of his ter in the ocean by means of conducting i operations and in cooperation with ot forces. Of particular importance amountialled by aviation in the main the operations is the destruction of enemy without which one cannot count on such the ground forces. For this purpose,	liver strikes against ritory, on the sea and ts own independent her branches of armed ng the tasks being aters of military y aircraft groupings, cessful operations of special air operations
assigned to it, as was already mention strategic nuclear forces, and also desenemy targets in the depth of his term in the ocean by means of conducting is operations and in cooperation with other forces. Of particular importance among fulfilled by aviation in the main the operations is the destruction of enemy without which one cannot count on such	liver strikes against ritory, on the sea and ts own independent her branches of armed ng the tasks being aters of military y aircraft groupings, cessful operations of special air operations armies of the fronts

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	In modern war, the role is considerably increased for Military-Transport Aviation which, besides airlifting airborne assault forces, will find wide use in moving troops, arms and other material to the most diverse areas.	
	Intensive combat operations from the beginning of nuclear war will be developed by the air defense forces of the country. Namely, they are charged with the responsibility for repelling the global nuclear attack of enemy strategic forces, which, as is known, include intercontinental ballistic missiles, the missiles of nuclear submarines, and intercontinental bombers.	HUM
	Global nuclear attack, according to the views of the US military leadership, is expected to be conducted in the form of an aerospace operation in which operational-tactical nuclear means will be used simultaneously with strategic means. Obviously, success in repelling or even weakening an attack by nuclear forces of such a powerful and diversified nature can be achieved as a result of operations of the air defense forces of the country which are planned in advance, and coordinated with other branches of the armed forces, and first of all, with the strategic rocket troops and the nuclear forces of the navy, capable of destroying the nuclear means of the enemy in missile deployment areas and at airfields.	
	In repelling an enemy aerospace attack, it is particularly important to achieve a rapid commitment to action of the necessary air defense forces and means along the main axes of his strike, because to accomplish such a maneuver during the course of the strike will be extremely difficult. This requires a careful planning of operations of the air defense forces while it is still peacetime, establishing an optimum grouping of forces and maintaining them in the highest possible degree of combat readiness, and organizing a reliable service for early warning against an enemy attack.	
	The basic tasks of the navy, apparently, will be to destroy important enemy military economic targets, to weaken the strikes of his naval forces, and to cooperate with other	·
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task of destroying is assigned to miss	ned forces in destroying the enemy. The the military economic power of the enemy sile-carrying nuclear submarines composing the navy. They will cooperate closely rocket troops.
combat enemy missil carriers. Exception accomplishment is complying a large a actions within the form of a strategic of the enemy navy in the strategic of the strategic o	e submarines and strike aircraft 50X1-HUM mally complex as far as its concerned, this task will require framework of a single aim will take the operation to destroy the strike forces in an ocean theater. The navy will also
assault-landing for his sea communicati the front troops, a	ces while in transit at sea, disrupting ons, and also tasks for fire support of dvancing on a coastal approach, for ments for the fronts, and for landing landing forces.
nuclear war, in its entire diversity of alone can not be ac all branches of the tion, and with the will fulfil their a cooperation of the branches of the arm operations lies ens the results of thei airborne troops, fr fleets. Of decisive tion is an advantage nuclear strikes amo forces of the front the operations of the In the concludation of th	been convinced once more that in a decisive period, fulfilment of the its tasks by strategic nuclear forces hieved. Finding broad use in it will be armed forces, which in close cooperadecisive role of strategic rocket troops, ssigned tasks. At the heart of the strategic rocket troops with other ed forces in the theaters of military uring the most effective exploitation of r strikes by the ground forces and ont and long-range aviation, and the eimportance in organizing the cooperacous allocation of the targets for ng the strategic nuclear forces and the s and fleets, and also coordination of hese forces and means in regard to time. ing period of a nuclear war, if such a of the branches of the armed forces can
participate. Howev	er, their role in the overall strategic
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task will substantially change since the main goal of this period will apparently consist of pressing home the destruction of enemy groupings of troops in the theater of military operations and the seizure of his territory. It is easy to see that the decisive role in the fulfilment of this task will belong to the ground forces. They will be forced to operate under very difficult conditions. It will be necessary to create new groupings of forces from the surviving large units, units and subunits. On some axes these groupings sometimes will not possess the features of complete operational formations such as a front and an army. It will become very difficult to implement mobilization measures and to supply troops with arms and other equipment, and at times it will be practically impossible.

The basic method of achieving the goals of the concluding period will be an offensive by the ground forces with the support of the surviving forces and means of the other branches of the armed forces. In these conditions the action on both sides will be intensified because of their great effort to retain the initiative, to very quickly exploit the results achieved by nuclear strikes, and to press home the destruction of the enemy. Each side will try to go over to the offensive ahead of the other, to deliver strikes along selected axes to prevent the deployment of enemy forces, and to destroy any groupings he may have created. The initiative can repeatedly shift from one side to the other. At the same time the offensive is going over, fierce defensive engagements can develop on individual axes.

During this period the <u>Air Defense Troops of the Country</u> will most likely continue fighting against the surviving enemy aviation forces, his main strike force. Therefore, after enemy nuclear strikes, it will first be necessary to restore the forces and means of antiaircraft defense to protect the most important installations using the air defense forces and means of the ground troops and the navy.

It must be assumed that aviation losses will be so high that it will be able to fulfil only a very limited number of the tasks to destroy individual important mobile targets in

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support of advancing groupings of ground forces. Transport aviation will be used to support these ground forces and to provide supplies and airlifts.

The navy can preserve a considerable amount of its forces because it will be dispersed by the time of the enemy nuclear strike. These forces can be directed to intercept sea crossings by the enemy who will attempt to restore the combat power of his groupings in the theater of military 50X1-HUM operations; and they can also be used to combat surviving enemy submarines and his strike aircraft carriers.

In a war begun with the use of conventional means only, there are some special features in the actions of the different branches of the armed forces in the first possible periods. During the period of non-nuclear actions the main burden for fulfilling tasks will fall on the ground forces, aviation, the navy, and the border formations of the Air Defense Troops of the Country. This period will be characterized by an all-out effort by both sides to inflict maximum destruction on the enemy, especially on his nuclear grouping, and to secure a more advantageous position for further actions. It will be especially important to gain air supremacy because it will sharply limit the enemy use of nuclear weapons by its aviation against our groupings of ground forces and other objectives in the theater of military operations when the transition is made to nuclear operations. This is achieved by carrying out special operations to destroy the strike forces of enemy aviation on airfields and in the air and to disrupt its system of control and of fuel and munitions supply.

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In operations involving the limited employment of nuclear weapons, there will be a sharp increase in the capabilities of troops to destroy the main enemy groupings in a strategic operation in a theater of military operations. Their initial efforts will be directed towards the destruction of enemy nuclear forces by delivering strikes against enemy aviation at airfields, missile positions, and main control posts; and the destruction of the strongest groupings of ground forces. The navy, jointly with long-range aviation, will concentrate its strikes

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against the submarines a	main enemy groupings at sea, especially his and strike aircraft carriers.
Strikes	by operational-tactical nuclear means will be
of decisive	significance. At the same time, while fighting
increasingly	initiative, each side will strive to deliver powerful strikes in order to assure the timely
commitment o	of action of its strategic nuclear forces
sides. strat	the amount of nuclear means used by the two tegic operations, by their resoluteness and
intensity an	d by the nature of the tasks performed by
above-mention	take on many of the features of the oned operations of an unlimited nuclear war. 50X1-
In a no	on-nuclear war, i.e., under conditions in which
conventional	tions will be conducted only with the use of means of destruction, our Armed Forces may be
faced with t	he tasks of delivering a decisive blow against
of military	oupings of enemy troops in land and sea theaters operations and of seizing his territory.
Unquestionab	ly, most of the tasks in the achievement of the
war aims wil	I be fulfilled by the ground forces. Operations
operation in	ll take on a decisive role in a strategic a theater of military operations. Efforts of
the other br	anches of the armed forces, in the final
analysis, wi	Il be directed to assisting the ground forces to be main tasks of destroying the groupings of
destroying h	is nuclear means, and seizing his territory. 50X1-
Fronts	will evidently carry out their missions
initially by	using the same forces (besides the nuclear
means) as in	a nuclear war. The constant threat of enemy ar weapons will not allow the creation of
relatively d	ense strike groupings. In a number of cases it
will be nece	ssary to concentrate forces for a strike against
designated f	ortant objectives first by reducing the forces or the capture of secondary objectives. It will
be necessary	to break up the enemy piecemeal by delivering
strikes agai	nst his groupings on individual axes, then nd destroying him. Should the enemy set up
encircling a	nd descripting name. Should the enemy set up
encircling a	

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strong defensive lines, the staffs and troops must be prepared to quickly organize and carry out a breakthrough.

In carrying out military operations without using nuclear arms, no less responsible tasks are assigned to front aviation which under these circumstances constitutes the basic long-range means of destruction for the front. It is aviation that will be assigned the task of defeating enemy aviation on airfields and in the air and of destroying his operational-tactical missiles and his air support for his advancing forces. All this requires that front aviation be used economically, that it be assigned primarily those targets and installations which affect the enemy combat effectiveness the most.

In a non-nuclear war, the quick destruction of enemy aviation and naval strike forces is of great importance. To accomplish this, special air and naval operations can be conducted with the participation of several front aviation air armies, large units of long-range aviation, and naval forces. Their basic purpose will be to deliver powerful strikes against enemy aviation at its air bases, against ship groupings at sea and at naval bases, and against aviation and naval control posts.

Proceeding from the nature of modern wars as we have examined them here and from the tasks that may be assigned to the different branches of the armed forces, it is not difficult to come to the conclusion that, along with strengthening the power of the strategic nuclear forces, especially the strategic rocket troops, it is also necessary to increase in every possible way the strike power of the ground forces, the Air Defense Troops of the Country, aviation, and the navy; and we must also improve their capability of solving operational and strategic tasks with or without the use of nuclear weapons.

The further development of strategic nuclear forces will proceed along the lines of increasing their degree of readiness to deliver strikes; the invulnerability of missiles in positions and in flight towards their targets; protection from countermeasures of enemy radiotechnical

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means; and stability of guidance and accuracy in reaching the targets. The main means of delivering nuclear munitions in the immediate future will still be ballistic missiles fired from stationary, mobile, and underwater launch positions.
The accuracy of intercontinental ballistic missiles is achieved not only by perfecting the operation of the guidance mechanism during the powered-flight phase of the flight trajectory but also by guidance of the nose cone during the free-flight phase when entering the atmosphere. As far as protection of the nose cone in flight is concerned, the following are the principal ways being contemplated: the creation of multiple (with several separate warheads) and maneuvering nose cones; accompanying them in flight with false targets or jamming transmitters; and protecting the nose cones from x-ray radiation of a nuclear burst. Our probable enemies are conducting important work on creating space strike means, including orbital aircraft, and support systems for operations of the strategic nuclear forces (reconnaissance, navigation, and communications).
Ever-increasing importance is being attached to rocket troops and to missile/nuclear weapons in other branches of the armed forces as the principal means of conducting combat operations. Their further development is directed first of all toward increasing their range and accuracy, reducing the time of launch preparation, and improving the reliability and simplicity of operation.
The ground forces will receive more powerful missile systems: and there will be an increase in the quantity and quality of their artillery, especially antitank missile means, air defense means, tanks, and armored vehicles. This will increase still more their fire and strike power and their capability of repelling enemy air attacks; and it will also increase their mobility, i.e., it will allow them to be highly maneuverable under the most complex conditions of war. The further development of the means of armed combat will require an improvement in the organizational structure of forces at both the tactical and operational levels.

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	given to increasing fighter bombers a conventional wear in fighter and respond to the probability necessary to stream which assault aim being conducted a world toward increasing their logical conditions.	y more attention in ing the proportion and adapted for use with pons. Significant of econnaissance aviating a rengthen air support reraft will be develout the present time reasing the range are, including extreme capability to operating and at night. Autiority given to guieans.	and development both nuclear a changes are contion. The acknown on-nuclear war of ground force loped. Importan in the armies on speed of aircely low altitude ate in complex mariation armament	of ind cemplated rledgement makes it es, for it work is of the craft at es, and deteoro- it is being
	supersonic speed naval aviation; t increased; and ho	rying and reconnaiss are being developed the range and accuration of the second	for long-range acy of missiles earch and target	vith and are being ing
	following the ling speeds at various low; these will provide with heavy and laterior of the confinition of military operations integrated respectively.	ment of Military-Trane of creating aircres altitudeshigh, maked for transportance combat equal country to the entire ations without refuence the mavigational and flicother weapons for contents.	raft with supers medium, and extraction of landi ipment from the ce depth of the eling. The airclight equipment,	emely ng forces deep theater raft will as well
	is being given to the search for no basis of these me a non-nuclear wan methods and means against aircraft	ion in the development of the creation of an ew physical principleans. At the same to does not lessen the sof combat against which operate at loof least importance	nti-missile mean les to be used a sime, the possib ne need to find aviation, espec ow and extremely	s and to s the cility of new cially low
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	role of the antiaircraft guided modern aircraft with great accommodern	l missiles which car	destroy
~	The common tendency in the of the principal world powers of submarine forces, especially submarines which can carry lone antisubmarine means; and the incarrying aviation. Here, specto increasing the strike power increasing their submergence dethe propulsion noise, improving and improving their handling as work is being contemplated to naval forces and means to conduct the process of the propulsion of the propulsion noise, improving and improving their handling as work is being contemplated to naval forces and means to conduct the propulsion of th	consists of the furty the number of nucley-range missiles and approvement of navalual significance is of nuclear submaring their means of obsided armament. Considerations of the capability of	ther growth lear missile- attached les, l, reducing servation, lerable
		; 	50X1-HUM
(来)	Thus, in a modern war, red branch of the armed forces can tasks. The skilful utilization each of the branches to fulfil will guarantee victory. All th harmoniously, in certain defined development of all the branches into account the fulfilment of subordination of this development principles of Soviet military s	resolve all the divation of the strong feat the overall strategates obliges us to context to the te proportions, the sof the armed force the main requirement and to the common, or	rerse tures of tic mission ombine 50X1-HUM es, taking
	The correct understanding and the proper employment of the armed forces to fulfil success them. This is why our leading and creative collectives of the institutions must make a deep scarry out the timely development armed forces in war which meet determine the problems and prince operations. The problem is not study of the process of development and of it and to keep moving the head of it and to keep moving the standard of the process of development armed forces.	te armed forces will fully the missions be command cadres and the higher military eduction of military after the following modern requirements aciples of troop commonly to keep up with ment but, mainly, to	allow the efore scientific lucational fairs; using and labat the the
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